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Abstract: This paper discusses the importance and role of values in design education.
As design scenarios constantly change, so do values pertaining to design. Design
education should be ahead of those changes, however the theoretical development of
design has not given values the same importance as other issues. This paper presents
a theoretical framework to help understand the role of values in current design
learning. It provides a general comprehension of how values affect both designing and
design outcomes, thus aiming to offer arguments that strengthen the awareness and
importance of ethical and moral issues in design education.
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Gabriel Hernández

Introduction
This paper is divided into two sections: The first will outline four scenarios in which
design and values are interrelated, distinguishing three of them as key to
understanding values' role within design education.
The second section will examine the role that values have in design education,
exploring the implications of three main perspectives: design praxiology, design
axiology, and teaching and learning to design.
Finally, it will draw conclusions and outline future challenges.

1 Four scenarios for values and design
Values and design are reciprocally embedded in one another. Design discovers,
proposes and questions, features products, projects or services, it encompasses
attributes of inner worth. However, most literature is ambiguous, because it does not
distinguish the frame of reference from which values are drawn. This creates confusion,
since values can be many things (beliefs, aspirations, attributes, moral precepts, ethical
rules, etc.), so when we refer to values in design, what values are we talking about? In
addressing this question, this paper will begin by outlining four possible scenarios for
values and design in order to characterize their particular perspectives, and then go on
to discuss those that are related to design education.
In English, one of the common problems that design theory faces is that the term
design is polysemous, being noun, verb and adjective. As a noun, design refers to either
1
the profession or the discipline, as well as its outcomes (products, services), whilst as a
verb it refers to the design process (designing) (Lawson 2005). Besides the previous
alternatives, design as an adjective is used to describe the attributes of something, e.g.
“designer jeans” or “design hotels”. In theoretical discussions – due to such
particularity - the term design induces frequent errors, since it conveys different
meanings with neither grammatical nor syntactical alterations to the word. Ludwig
Wittgenstein believed that philosophical problems occur when “the language goes on
vacation” (cited in Echeverría 2011), although it seems that in the case of the word
design, it enjoys a permanent holiday.
A similar situation occurs with the word values, which conveys different
significances depending on the context in which is being used, so that the combination
of design and values becomes hazy and a difficult concept to grasp.
Aiming to facilitate understanding, a simple diagram encompasses an explanation
2
(see Fig.1). Both design and values are each shown as verb and noun, thus tracing out
3
four scenarios. Each scenario encompasses a particular understanding of the joining of
design and values according to syntactical and grammatical combinations, they are:





Design values (the values of design)
Designing values
Valuing design (the value of design outcomes)
Valuing designing (the value of the design process)

1

Some researchers will disagree with this consideration; however, aiming to simplify the discussion, the term
“discipline” will be used to name the field in which design operates.
2
Design as adjective has not been considered because it results in applied characteristics of the subject,
which are exogenous to it, e.g. designerly values.
3
A scenario can be understood as a particular situation in which design operates.
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Figure 1. Four possible scenarios for the combination of design and values.

Design values, or the values of design, refers to principles embedding either the
field of study or the design profession. In these domains, the term design values refers
to the axiological study of design (Archer 1976), which is the philosophical study of the
ethics and aesthetics of design. However, as we will see, based on the perspective
presented by Dewey (1936), design values stand rather closer to the moral than to the
ethical.
On the other hand, designing values alludes either to the constituent
principles present in the design process and/or to the action of perceiving or
developing attributes of worth in such a process. The study of these principles involves
the application of scientific methods, mainly in the research domain, which would
constitute design science, which is the study of design practice, or “the scientific study
of design” (Cross 1999), implied by the design term praxiology. In this sense, designing
values rests mainly on the ground of ethics, since it accounts for professional codes of
fairness and justice.
Professional practice and design education are both topics within the study of
design praxiology, which has been mainly related with decision-making in design;
Trimingham (2008) proposes a taxonomy encompassing two kinds of values in decisionmaking: external and internal values. However – for the purposes of this paper – a
clearer distinction – between subjective and objective values (Prall 1929) – is preferred
based on the precision that the terms convey. Subjective and objective values belong to
different epistemological domains. Subjective values rest on human interpretation, so
they are relative and hence represent a constructivist stance (designing values), whilst
objective values are independent of human interpretation, they are absolute and hence
representative of a positivist approach (design values).
Subjective values are susceptible to evaluation; as Lawson asserts, “For such an
item there is no right answer since different purchasers are likely to place different
values on factors such as manoeuvrability or reliability” (Lawson 2005, 78). On the
other hand, objective values are prescriptive, as Mayal notes: “ …I decided to identify a
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number of principles in design which are as appropriate to the design of an aeroplane
as they are to that of an armchair” (Mayal 1979, 5), illustrating that positivist laws are
not a matter of interpretation, they are simply obeyable.
Valuing design alludes to the process of measuring the assets present in products or
services, which may or may not be tangible. In this sense this activity has its place in
both the design engineering and design management domains. For management
scholars, valuing design has been a main concern because of the difficulty of finding an
adequate framework to evaluate design different aspects; as Lockwood rightfully
claims, “Design may enhance performance, but unless there are metrics to gauge that
benefit, the difference it makes depends on conjecture and faith” (Lockwood 2007, 90).
Although some authors include “the worth” delivered by design within the term design
value, what they are really addressing is a valuing design perspective. This is truly a
confusing issue in design theory, since the same syntactical structures may signify two
different things.
Finally, valuing designing applies to the task of assessing the processes of
conceiving, developing and delivering new goods, projects or services (e.g. Total Quality
Management (TQM), Total Quality Control (TQC), Benchmarking, Reverse Engineering).
Even though some companies develop methods for evaluating those processes, with
special attention to efficiency and quality, such as Motorola with Six Sigma in 1986
(Tennant 2001), it seems that there is a mismatch between evaluation and
development. Lawson (2005) notes that there is not enough evidence for how the
contribution of scientific tools to design assessment improves design standards.
Alternatively, the practice of valuing designing seems to be particularly relevant in
design education, where students' judgement skills are being shaped and enhanced. In
most cases, design education is performed based on a model of practice inherited from
the beaux arts, based on masters and apprentices, which has spread worldwide as
“studio” (“atelier” in French, “taller” in Spanish, “Werkstatt” in German). Lawson and
Dorst note that when looking at the education of architects and industrial or urban
designers, “remarkably similar patterns” can be seen (Lawson and Dorst 2009, 16). In
fact, learning to design has been developed via what is actually known as “scaffolding”,
a process in which students are closely assessed with special regard to their
judgemental skills.
Based on the previous classification, three main perspectives – designing values,
design values and valuing designing – have to be considered in relation to design
education. The first conveys the development of design praxiology, it deals with values
that arise in design practice; the second, design axiology, is concerned with values
attached to the disciplinary sphere, and the third relates to teaching and learning to
design. Each perspective will be analyzed to show its main characteristics and
implications for design education.
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Three perspectives for understanding values in design
education
1 D ESIGN PRAXIOLOGY : D ESIGNING VALUES
4
During the 1960s, the Design Methods Movement established the theoretical
5
foundations that allowed the improvement of design praxis understanding through
rationales that could explain the design process. Some years after, Archer made claims
for the development of Design Praxiology, that he defined as “the study of design
techniques, skills and judgement applied in a given area” (Archer 1976). His definition
points towards the development of this specific branch into the broader field of design
studies initiated by John Chris Jones and Christopher Alexander.
In general, the Design Methods Movement's aim was to outline a universal design
method, a kind of model that could fit every situation, or a general design procedure
that might tackle any design problem. Their research explored the procedures that can
be observed in the design process, aiming to find the answer in design practice. In this
approach, values were ascribed to the method, in other words they were methodcentred. However, the understanding of design methods has changed radically since
that time, being now regarded no longer as an end but as a mean to an end. So, what is
the role of values in current design practice and how do they influence design learning?
To answer this question, two main roles are devised:
1. Ensuring answer uniqueness: Learning to design means exercising design practice
(designing values), where decisions are led by judgements that create a distinction
between one designer and other; as Lawson asserts:
“This knowledge is predictive but uncertain and laden with values. It is clear that
the application of such knowledge is a highly selective process and therefore
inevitably results in designers making their own unique interpretation of design
problems.” (Lawson 2004, 14)
Lawson's assertion also explains why computers do not design (they just optimize).
The same components, ideas, requirements and constraints programmed into different
computers result in a common answer: the optimal, since computers' decisions are
value-free. Apocalyptic films in which machines take control of the world base their
arguments on this fact. In contrast, inherent to human decisions, values are a key issue
in design answers. Design processes emerge from singular interpretations and decisions
that each designer makes, either for framing the problem or for finding the answer,
making different and unique proposals.
Furthermore, design theories have concentrated the explanation of such
uniqueness in spheres like singular abilities: "Great design does not come from great
processes; it comes from great designers" (Brooks 2010); personal expertise (Lawson
and Dorst 2009; Cross 2011); background or context of practice (Scandinavian, Italian,
British “heroic” designers). Alternatively, Trimingham sees design decision-making as
related to values, observing that “an initial literature review found that the role of
values within decision-making had been largely unexplored” (Trimingham 2008, 38),
thus providing a useful framework to understand values in design.
Trimingham classifies values into two groups:
4
5

1962−1972 approx.
Practice, as distinguished from theory (Oxford 2012).
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1. External values:





Societal values;
Identified stakeholder values;
Economic system values;
Values embedded in design;

2. Internal values:







Perceived societal values;
Perceived identified stakeholder values;
Perceived economic system values;
Embedding values in design;
Designer’s personal values;
Meta-values.

Moreover, this framework is also useful for explaining a second role of design
values.
2. Fostering a design answers understanding: As noticed, Trimingham’s classification
can be better understood by replacing external and internal values by subjective and
objective values, as previously noted by Prall (1929). Furthermore, both subjective and
objective values each host sub-types of values: those embedded in “something”
(design, stakeholders, technology), and those which are society-based. Accordingly,
Lewis proposes a framework accounting for three kinds of values: intrinsic, extrinsic
and inherent. He affirms that:
“The intrinsically valuable is usually described as that which is good in itself or good
for its own sake; the extrinsically valuable, as that which has value as instrumental
to something else”, and “ …inherent mean to suggest that the value in question is
one which is found or findable in the object itself to which the value is attributed.”
(Lewis 1950, 380, 391)
In this sense, Lewis's proposal may conform to an axis based on opposing intrinsic
and extrinsic values, while inherent values can be place equidistant from the previous
two concepts (see Fig.2). Adding Lewis’s referential axis to Trimingham’s categorization
results in four areas, representing four different epistemological perspectives, and
hence four different ways of perceiving knowledge. Identifying the values in each one
may improve our understanding of their nature and, accordingly, our design decisions.
For instance, distinguishing personal values from technical or cultural values may lead
to selecting more suitable methods for either research or to evaluate ideas associated
with them.
Accordingly, some researchers believe that personal values are the result of societal
values, e.g. Norman (2008) who sees design knowledge as something that is inherited
from society, whereby personal beliefs are influenced by external values. He supports
his opinion with Cross’s viewpoint: “Designers have the ability to both ‘read’ and ´write’
in this culture… ” (Cross 1982), conveying the idea that designers are sensitive to
cultural influences, yet able to contribute to the creation of culture too. Both root their
understanding of design value in social constructionism, in which design is the result
and expression of culture.
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Figure 2. Epistemological domains of values based on Trimingham (2008) and Lewis (1950).

2 D ESIGN AXIOLOGY : D ESIGN VALUES
Before the 20th century, most philosophical theories comprising axiological issues
were merged with metaphysical and epistemological topics (Hart 1971). By the
beginning of the 20th century, Lapie coined the term axiology in his seminal work
Logique de la Volonté (Lapie 1902), after which many other philosophers, such as
Ehrenfels, Meinong, Prall, Scheler, Hartmann, Moore, Ross, Dewey and Lewis,
developed different understandings of the term. Axiology deals with the philosophical
study of values, and although values may be regarded as abstract entities lying far
beyond our daily life, they coexist in most of our common actions, as Hart lucidly
asserts:
“The concept of value permeates our life in every step. We prefer one thing to
another, we shift our attention from one event to another, we praise one
behaviour and condemn another, we like and dislike, and whenever we do it we
value.” (Hart 1971, 29)
For Hart then, valuing is an everyday activity, yet his assertion implies an implicit
fact: we evaluate with regard to something – i.e. to value. In this sense, judgements
presuppose a frame of reference against which every thing, action or behaviour is
assessed. Echeverría states that whenever we evaluate, we must confine our
assessments to specific domains of action (Echeverría 2011), such that values reside in
domains. In the case of design for instance, efficiency – as an outcome – is accounted
for as a value in the domain of mechanical design, but it is not necessarily included in
toy design or in the design of ceremonial places.
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Hence, in which domains must design values be found? Addressing this question,
Archer considers axiology to be “the study of goodness or value in design phenomena,
with special regard to the relations between technical, economic, moral and aesthetic
values” (Archer 1976, 14). However, in Archer’s definition, design domains seem to be
too broad; according to the previous diagram (Fig. 2), technical values are positivist and
economic values reside in sociological positivism, whereas moral and aesthetic values
are perceived from a social constructivist perspective.
Trimingham also considers values in the broad sense of the term, comprising either
values that meet society’s needs, wants, feelings, aspirations and demands, or desires
which do not necessarily relate to the sense of goodness previously accounted for by
Archer. Dewey was particularly interested in this particular dilemma, aiming to make a
distinction between genuine and spurious values. On Dewey’s thoughts, Hart asserts
that" “Statements of what we like, desire, are no proper value judgements. They merely
record what we like or dislike” (Hart 1971, 37). Hart explains that Dewey’s search for
genuine values is attached to the concept of morality, in which social well-being acts as
the guiding norm. So, following Dewey’s search for genuine values, do genuine values
in design exist?
The key distinction provided by Dewey is to relate values to morality, instead of
ethics or mere assessment frames. Moral deals with goodness and rightness, whereas
ethics involve behaving in a fair and honest way according to a code of conduct,
especially in relation to a profession. In this sense, if ethics relates to praxis, it relates to
decision-making too, so design decisions have ethical implications; however, ethical
decisions should not be confused with “like” judgements made at lower decisionmaking levels.
However, generalizations around the concept of value in design decision-making do
not necessarily imply an absence of Dewey’s genuine values in design. Alternatively,
those values may have emerged via design-related fields, like sustainability and
usability. In this sense, Dewey’s ideas can be good criteria for discerning genuine design
values.
Another characteristic of design values is their positivist character. Since design
deals with the world to be created, good or bad design decisions affect people's lives,
as well as their environments. Bad design decisions may result from bad design
processes, but also from a lack of proper guiding principles or values. The famous
designer Richard Dreyfuss referred to that as “the five-point formula” when he
declared:
“We have a yardstick in our office for good industrial design. It represents twentyfive years of experience, and we apply it to every design problem. It has five points:
1) Utility and safety, 2) Maintenance, 3) Cost, 4) Sales appeal, 5) Appearance.”
(Dreyfuss 2004, 178)
Dreyfuss’ principles comprise a mix of moral values (utility and safety) and technical,
economic and aesthetic values (the remainder), developed from experience, which
supposes their refinement through failure and success. In this case, values act as
precepts (existing before concepts), becoming positivist principles even before they
were built in practice (rooted in constructivism). However, referring to principles might
indicate the rightness of some ideas over others; as Lawson warns: “ …there are
dangers there. The comfort of a set of principles may be one thing, but to become
dominated by a doctrinaire approach is another” (Lawson 2005, 162). In fact, the
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problem with values and principles is that – as a matter of routine, time or power –
they may blind our judgement, subjugate our design freedom.
Furthermore, encompassing the philosophical problem of defining values is the
linguistic problem (again Wittgenstein) of releasing them from their pronouncement;
for instance, the Evolving manifesto for eco-pluralistic design states: “the thoughtful
st
designer of the 21 century will design with integrity, sensitivity and compassion”, then
adding as its first point: “Design to satisfy real needs rather than transient, fashionable
or market-driven needs” (Fuad-Luke 2009, 15). Indeed, the first sentence accounts for
some values expressed as a law (mandatory), while the second phrase does not
describe values, yet it conveys them tacitly in the form of guidelines. Furthermore, the
book Universal Principles of Design presents one hundred concepts that their authors
introduce, commenting: “broadly referred [to] as “principles” consist[ing] of laws,
guidelines, human biases, and general design considerations” (Lidwell, Holden, and
Butler 2010, 10), although many of the principles accounted for, such as accessibility,
affordance or forgiveness, rest on values deeply rooted in Universal Design, where
compassion and equality are leading moral ideas.
However, the linguistic problem of discerning values from grammatical structure
can be solved by using a non-grammatical criterion, such as the one introduced by
Dewey. In this sense, the confusion created by concepts such as axioms, principles,
postulates, premises, surmises, rules, norms, maxims, protocols, canons, precepts, laws
or guidelines can be overcome by assessing the worth they convey to social well-being.
3 T EACHING AND LEARNING TO DESIGN : V ALUING DESIGNING
Actually, design training aimed at achieving professional degrees is taught in higher
education institutions. In that context, values can be placed on two levels: at school in
the form of institutional principles, policies and strategies, and at the individual level.
Values at the school level operate as macro orientations, providing a frame of
6
reference based on principles that shape the ethos or identity of the academic
community, for instance: “use design thinking, to inspire multidisciplinary teams”
(Stanford) or “Compassion: we strive to alleviate others´ suffering by assisting them in
realizing their values and visions” (KAOSPilot). While the first example deals with
teaching-learning strategies (community values) inclined towards the concept of
competency, the second deals with moral values linked to responsibility.
Findeli – accounting for the outcomes of a research project about ethics at the
School of Design of the University of Montreal – asserts: “There can be no responsible
design without a responsible designer, i.e. education should be directed to the
development of an individualistic ethics” (Findeli 2001). His concern deals with designer
values at the project level. Projects, either group based or individual, convey
discussions about personal preferences and convictions into design answers.
Responsibility is then related to either the ethical or moral compromises that designing
involves, or in other words the awareness that design process decisions affect the
world, encompassing positive, neutral or negative consequences.
This issue was largely addressed by Papanek in his 1970s book Design for the Real
World which, in a chapter entitled “Design Responsibility”, states: “Today the myriad
objects of daily use are mass-produced to a utilitarian and aesthetic standard often
completely unrelated to the consumer’s needs” (Papanek 1971, 220). Papanek critiques

6
The characteristic spirit of a culture, era, or community, as manifested in its beliefs and aspirations (Oxford
2012).
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the absurd disconnection between supply and demand that gives rise to
overproduction, thus disregarding such consequences as waste, pollution, the
overexploitation of natural resources and cheap labour issues, among many other
problems. Today, forty years after Papanek’s claim, in a world dominated by market
forces, his claim seems to remain valid regarding the aggravation of those problems. In
that sense, Findeli asserts: “design responsibility means that designers always should
be conscious of the fact that, each time they engage themselves in a design project,
they somehow recreate the world” (Findeli 2001). Assenting to Findeli’s opinions, the
author believes that responsible design is an urgent discussion to be developed in
design education. However, both ethical and moral values are a thorny matter and the
most obvious question arising is how we define what is valuable and what is not, or
what the values are that design should embrace. This question is not new, as Coles and
Norman quote: “Cross says of education, deciding what is worthwhile is “Obviously
value-laden and problematic”" (Cross 1982, 222), raising the concern that teachers’
questions about what values have to be taught are already affected by teachers’ own
values.
Furthermore, values at the school level are also conveyed by means of learning
strategies. For instance, Buchanan describes the implementation of a new design
course – at Carnegie Mellon University – via a metaphor that compares two distinct
perspectives in literature: rhetoric and grammar. He states:
“The relationship of these two approaches is perhaps evident if one observes that
the last chapter of a school grammar book is usually a chapter devoted to “how to
write an essay”. In contrast, the last chapter of a school rhetoric book is a chapter
on grammar style.” (Buchanan 2001, 13)
Carnegie Mellon’s new course is based on “the rhetoric of design”, replacing a
traditional one based on “the grammar of design”. Buchanan argues that giving
students reasons to design, instead of providing them with the tools for that, is what
primarily triggers students' motivation. His assertion illustrates a change of focus from
teaching “something” (instructive) to teaching to “someone” (formative). In fact, the
grammar approach resides in the belief that particular issues should be taught before
general ones, creating a sort of technical base (that can be ethical too) that will help
students to take decisions when designing. Accordingly, schools based on that vision
will privilege the delivery of content over individual motivation, and hence the body of
content that every student must know to become a designer has to be defined a priori.
That represents a kind of positivist education, in which practice has to be performed
within the limits of a theoretical frame of reference – values included – as occurs in
many engineering design schools. In this context, values might take the form of
positivist axioms, such as “less is more”, “truth to materials” or “form follows function”,
accounting for aesthetic values, or ethical values, such as those accounted for in the
Principles for Responsible Management Education:
“We will develop the capabilities of students to be future generators of sustainable
value for business and society at large and to work for an inclusive and sustainable
global economy.” (United Nations 2007)
In contrast, the rhetoric model conveys a flux from general to particular knowledge,
so that learning is grounded in understanding design problems instead of knowing
predetermined bodies of content. The belief that design problems are so vast and
diverse that no design course is able to teach the whole scope of matters to deal with
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those problems supports this strategy. So what this stance comprises is a way of
approaching problems, or what Cross calls “designerly ways of knowing” (Cross 2007).
In this understanding, it is the general framing of a specific problem that demands
particular knowledge according to the nature and scope of that problem. In addition,
the rhetoric model builds on students’ ability and values, encouraging them to act –
framing problems and solutions – according to their own principles.
Alternatively, values placed at the individual level in design learning mainly
correspond to personal decisions over design projects, which can be perceived as being
reflected in learning outcomes. Traditionally, learning outcomes were related to the
results of cognitive operations converging in the concept of respondency, the ability to
be able to give an answer whereas, regarding values, learning outcomes relate to
responsibility, defined as “the state of having a duty to deal with something”, but also
“a moral obligation to behave correctly toward or in respect of” (Oxford 2012). The first
definition of responsibility points to “being in charge” of, while the second to a duty to
act according to a frame of values.
Kimbell and Stables propose the concept of capability, as a merging of competency
and responsibility. Regarding knowledge just as a medium to act on the world, for
them, to act goes beyond mere intervention, it is making such intervention count, as
they assert:
“Whilst some might prioritise knowledge, understanding and scholarship as the
cornerstones that mark out the “educated” person, we hold a somewhat different
view. We prefer a view of education that celebrates qualities that empower people
to make a difference in the world.” (Kimbell and Stables 2008, 13)
At the present time, one of the main criticisms that can be made of traditional
education (rooted only in the acquisition of knowledge and mainly concentrated on
demanding learners’ answers) is that neither procedural nor theoretical knowledge is
commonly paired with ethic or moral virtues, whereas the overvaluation of knowledge
as a key issue in education has mistakenly turned itself into a goal, as Kimbell and
Stables state: “knowledge is a resource, a means to an end, not and end in itself” (ibid.;
36). By the same token, it is questionable why neither ethical nor moral principles have
been widely taught, as they should be. Furthermore, the belief that values underlie
shared cultural observances and thus are automatically acquired (Cross 1982; Norman
2008) encompasses the inaccuracy of considering values as a sack containing societal
needs, wants and cultural standards, or what Dewey calls “spurious values”. Moreover,
that vision represents a social constructionist vision in which values are shaped by the
community, whereas considering values as immutable ruling principles constitutes a
positivist stance. However, as Hartmann notes: “the values themselves do not change.
Their nature is timeless, super historical. But the consciousness of them evolves”
(Hartmann 1926), denoting a link between positivist and constructivist perspectives.
Moreover, both visions are necessary in design. Issues such as corruption, ecological
damage, disregard of social needs and human rights show that knowledge is not always
coupled to ethical or cultural values either. The United Nations Global Compact
document “The Principles for Responsible Management Education” (2007) is an
example of how management has addressed that concern through protocols that
summarize consensus among practitioners, researchers, academics and stakeholders.
In design education, principles or values can also provide the design project’s raison
d'être, or what Buchanan (2001) calls “reasons for designing”. In this sense, personal
values act as drivers of learning, creating fertile conditions that stimulate students’
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engagement and enhance their ownership of the process. In fact, contemporary
educational theories consider students as protagonists in the learning process (the socalled learner-centred model), regarding individual ability and a particular learning pace
as initial conditions for the student’s development. Accordingly, educational goals are
no longer related to what a person knows, but to what a person can do with their
knowledge instead. Therefore, the learning process becomes a competence in itself, as
Kimbell and Stables note, quoting Oxman: “a form of education that is oriented to
“knowing rather than to knowledge” (Oxman 2001, 282), conveying the belief that
education should be grounded in developing learning ability rather than content. So
learning to learn is then seen as a core ability, but then what role do values play in
knowing and where are they supposed to be developed?
Regarding this question, two perspectives can be outlined: the first relates to
cognitive processes and the second to domains of practice.
As a basic distinction between cognitive processes, Ryle distinguishes between
“know that” and “know how” (Ryle 1949). In basic learning stages, knowing that –
mainly centred in the world of facts – learning outcomes are appraised by simply
retrieving taught ideas (Marzano and Kendall 2007). On the other hand, knowing how
involves more complex cognitive operations – comprehension, analysis, knowledge
utilization – (ibid.) involving procedural learning, the reason why Coles and Norman
(2005) note that some researchers associate know-how (in French savoir-faire) with
skills (Polanyi 1962; Hicks 1982).
However, according to learning progression, Marzano and Kendall propose a
taxonomy – based on Bloom’s improvement – that separates values from cognition and
places them within what they call the “self system”, described as:
“The self system consists of an interrelated arrangements of attitudes, beliefs, and
emotions. It is the interaction of these attitudes, beliefs, and emotions that
determines both motivation and attention.” (Marzano and Kendall 2007, 55)
The relevance of this proposal is that it establishes two categories of values in which
ethical/ moral value judgements are independent of technical principles; and,
moreover, the first commands the second. In fact, know-how is confined to the
“cognitive system”, where decision-making and problem-solving occur, whereas values
are placed within the “self system”, which rules the whole. This change of paradigm
implies that both knowing that and knowing how are now taught, bearing in mind “the
being's” development as a whole instead of just individual operative skills.
Finally, both knowing that and knowing how conform to the identity of every
profession, establishing domains of knowledge and associated practices in each case,
but furthermore an outline of disciplinary values. For instance, in Industrial Design,
knowing that and knowing how deal with materials, production technologies,
ergonomics and user experience issues, to name but some (Norman 2008). However,
the dominion of such ideas in design practice is led by judgements (which create the
distinction between one designer and other as already accounted for), but also each
specific matter has inherent values, such as comfort and adaptability in ergonomics.

Conclusions
Values in design education have seen meagre theoretical development in
comparison to other design areas. That may reflect the lack of importance that design
educators assign to values. At the same time, the indistinct use of the term value has
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resulted in theoretical misunderstandings in which is not clear to what the term really
refers. This paper has presented a model that, in the main, shows that values in design
can be understood from three different perspectives. The first considers values within
design practice, in which decision-making articulates values' emergence as frames of
reference for assessing design decisions. In this understanding, values’ role is neither
ethical nor moral, but “referential”.
The second considers the values attached to design practice, in which design
methods will confirm the framing of a code of practice that will outline ethical
implications. In this sense, as Cross proposes, design praxiology is the “study of the
practices and processes of design” as an elemental and necessary field for design
research (Cross 1999, 6). Since design practices are dynamic and constantly being
developed, this claim is justified.
The third perspective regards values as constituents of a disciplinary field that
explains them in relation to moral issues. Particularly relevant is Dewey’s point of view,
that relates “goodness” to social well-being.
Related to values in design education, all these perspectives are valid and useful,
however their differentiation is essential for a better understanding of them.
Moreover, in design education, the inclusion of values comes through the practice
of valuing designing, which corresponds to the educational enterprise of assessing
student’s work. Here, values can be displayed at the macro level – through school
principles or policies – and at micro or personal level, through projects. The first one
takes on the shape of general strategies that drive the identity of each school or
programme, while the second becomes the individual’s beliefs that thrive on learning
through motivation and engagement.
Actually, the shift in paradigms (Kuhn 1962) in education and in the design field
prompted a repositioning of values at the core of design education. An understanding
of values can nurture design education by providing a new foundation for design
courses. At the beginning, in the design profession, technical and aesthetic skills
conformed to key capabilities for designing. Lately, those abilities have been enhanced
by the mastery of design methods, extending design expertise from the factory to the
consumer’s realm. At the present time, however, the sum of economic, environmental
and social crises encompasses a new scenario for designing that is neither technical,
aesthetic nor methodological, but moral. If design is about acting on the world, it
seems inexcusable to consider first whether those actions are either necessary or
worthy, and to develop a deep understanding of design responsibilities and the
implications of designing. Design education should not be grounded only on providing
design answers; current world circumstances demand questioning of these answers
too. This demands the development of design axiology and design praxiology as bodies
of knowledge to nurture design education, and to envisage the future of both practice
and learning in design, going beyond the current boundaries of wealthy countries’
comfort zone.
The implementation of such knowledge in design education is however thorny,
since the bases of most Western economies where design has flourished are deeply
rooted in consumption, thus topics such as ethics and moral matters are mostly
subjugated to profit-related issues. Besides, design is not immune to the inertia of
tradition either. However, where there is a problem, there also lies an opportunity for
design. Moreover, design has demonstrated itself to be a powerful tool for developing
new strategies in which the traditional structures of business can be re-thought, as well
as in any other field to which design may be related.
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The challenges related to the implementation of values in design education are now
in the sphere of design theory, and it is the author’s belief and hope that, in
forthcoming years, design education will school not only skilled but wiser designers.
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